

LITERATURE

VOLUME X NUMBER 2

AND

PSYCHOLOGY

SPRING 1960.

Was ist nicht Spiel, das wir auf Erden treiben,
Und schien es noch so gross und tief zu sein!
Mit wilden Söldnerschaaren spielt der Eine.
Ein And'rer spielt mit tollen Aberglaubischen.
Vielleicht mit Sonnen, Sternen irgend wer, —
Mit Menschenseelen spiele ich. Ein Sinn
Wird nur von dem gefunden, der ihn sucht.
Es fliessen ineinander Traum und Wachen,
Wahrheit und Lüge. Sicherheit ist nirgends.
Wir wissen nichts von Andern, nichts von uns.
Wir spielen immer, wer es weiss, ist klug.

—Arthur Schnitzler, Paracelsus

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"Literature and the Individual Reader," by Maud Bodkin. 39

Miss Bodkin needs no introduction to our readers. We are pleased and honored that she should have given us the opportunity to publish both the comment on a previous paper noted above and the present distinguished study. It is an excellent custom of Miss Bodkin to prefix to all her published papers an analytical synopsis of their contents, and we present her synopsis of the present paper herewith:

"After a brief introduction, indicating why the article can be written 'even autobiographically', the first section (pp. 39-41) deals with that element in poetic and rhetorical writings termed 'word-music'. This 'music', in the poetry of Milton, and in passages of Shakespearian tragedy, helps to carry the archetypal significance of the poem.

"In the second section (pp. 41-43) the story told in the New Testament is considered, as its significance may be felt by an agnostic reader valuing it, not as an authoritative document of Christian faith but as a tragic story of great influence within our literary tradition, influencing the manner in which death is regarded in other poems and tragedies.

"The third section (pp. 43-44) includes only a few questions, suggesting what might be considered in an article upon individual responses to serious fiction, such as the novels of George Eliot, Conrad, and C. P. Snow."

"Thomas Mann and Psycho-Analysis: The Turning-Point," by Joyce Crick. 45

In our Bibliography (XXIV) in the Freud Centenary Issue (VI, 4, 140) we noted a 1956 thesis in German at the University of London, brought to our attention by its sponsor, Professor William Rose of that university. Professor Rose praised the work highly. "This thesis," he wrote, "does more than the title [The Impact of the Theories of Psycho-Analysis on the Later Works of Thomas Mann] promises, for it traces in detail Mann's attitude to psycho-analysis from his early days and comes to the conclusion that there were three stages in the development of his attitude."

Your Editor wrote to the author, then Miss Joyce Pumfrey Morgan, to ask for some part of the thesis which we could publish. Mrs. Crick was finally able to send us two important sections of her work, one dealing, as the title indicates, with the turning-point in Mann's attitude toward psychoanalysis, the other with his use of Freudian theory in a late work, Lotte in Weimar. We publish the first of these studies in this issue; the second will appear in a subsequent issue.

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An attempt to catch up on an accumulation of offprints received and pertinent notices and articles in recent issues of some journals.

NOTES, COMMENTS, AND CORRESPONDENCE

* * Professor Gaylord C. LeRoy of the Department of English at Temple University reports, with commentary, on a course in our field which he will teach there during future semesters.

English 255, a graduate seminar, will appear in the catalog under the title Literature and Psychology: a study of twentieth-century psychological theory (Freud, Jung, Adler, Rank, Fromm, and others) in literature and literary criticism.

At this point—a year before the course is to be given—I feel more certain about the contribution I shall expect of my students than about what my own contribution should be. I shall want the students to prepare papers analyzing and evaluating psychological criticism that has already appeared on authors with whom they have a good degree of familiarity. I shall ask them to distinguish between the kind of criticism that clarifies and deepens our awareness of the literature and the kind that seems rather to explain away complex literary phenomena by reducing them to their supposed psychological components. (There is a good deal of both kinds of criticism.) The emphasis in the papers will be on what the psychological theory contributes to our understanding of a particular work of literature. The course will therefore remain securely within the discipline of literary study, despite its special concern with psychological theory.

Only under unusual circumstances and with exceptionally qualified students would I approve of an attempt to do original literary criticism from the psychological point of view. I feel that it is a scholar's duty to discourage students from attempting a job which they are not properly qualified to tackle, and most of these students will be without professional training in psychology. I see nothing unscholarly, on the other hand, in encouraging students of literature to form a judgment on the value to literary study of the large amount of criticism that has been turned out by men professionally trained in psychology.

Ideally an undergraduate course in Freudian and allied psychological theory should precede the course I shall offer. This will probably not prove feasible, however, if only because of Freud's dubious academic status in the American college. At Temple, whereas the Department of Psychiatry in the Medical School does splendid work in the application of Freudian theory to broad areas of culture, the Psychology Department of the Liberal Arts College has the reputation of treating Freud with watchful mistrust.

As for my own contribution, I'll simply have to plan to respond to the needs of the class as they appear. If adequate background information could be taken for granted, I would give lectures illustrative of the kind of evaluation of psychological criticism that I want the students to attempt. I'll probably have to be prepared, however, to give background lectures on Freudian theory and its implications for literary study. My plan now is to work up these lectures, but with the idea of using them only in so far as they seem to be called for. G. C. L.

* * Miss Maud Bodkin has responded to our oft-repeated invitation to readers to comment on articles, book reviews, or other material which appears in our pages by the following comment on the analysis of Browning's "Childe Roland to the Dark Tower Came" by Professor Hughes (IX, 2, 18-19), writing to your Editor, "... it seemed to me, in regard to that rather enigmatic poem, the relation to Browning's Prospice, and to Plutarch on initiation ritual, was worth noting."

In Browning's poem of "Childe Roland", analyzed in the interesting, closely reasoned article by R. E. Hughes (Lit. & Psy. Spring 1959) an element balancing the motif of "retribution for wrong-doing" is that of challenge to the horror of death: Dauntless the slug-horn to my lips I set. The challenge motif appears more clearly if we compare the poem with that other challenge to death: Prospice, with its opening: Fear death? to feel the fog in my throat... Though the horror encountered here is imaged not by stagnation and disease, but by hostile energies: I am nearing the place, The power of the night, the press of the storm, The post of the foe; there seems relevance in the pattern. The choice as hero of the "Childe", "the uninitiated", suggests that the intention of Browning's mind in its unconscious working may have been to present the undergoing of such an initiation as ancient writers have described: journeying through the dark full of misgivings..... terrors of every kind..... after this a wonderful light..... voices and dances. In the ancient ritual, as in Prospice, the worst turns the best to the brave.

I am finding, of course, the Rebirth pattern. To me the differing emphasis of our two interpretations suggests that we who are interested to apply to poetry a psychological hypothesis, whether of Freud or of Jung, should beware of exclusiveness. The ideal critic, as Kenneth Burke has said ("Freud and the Analysis of Poetry" in The Philosophy of Literary Form [1941]), should not think of "one ingredient in the poem's essence" or 'whole motivation', but examine, rather, the interrelations among the various ingredients. M. B.

* * Professor Norman N. Holland of M. I. T. carries on our Shakespearean investigations with this myth-and-ritual study of

MACBETH AS HIBERNAL GIANT

As long ago as 1872, Karl Simrock pointed out that the wandering of Birnam Wood in Holinshed and therefore in Macbeth is more than just an early example of camouflage; it comes from Germanic legends of wandering woods, which in turn stem from such customs of worship as the May-ride or Summer-feast. "When the May-king, May-lord or Flower-lord returned home after the meeting in the woods, he and all his followers were so decked out in sprigs and green branches that it seemed as though a whole forest came marching." The parade signifies defeat for some beleaguered ruler, "originally a hibernial giant whose rule comes to an end when the May-festival begins and the greenwood comes marching: this is the myth at the root of the Macbeth story." (Karl Simrock, Die Quellen des Shakespeare in Novellen, Märchen und Sagen, 2. Aufl. [Bonn, 1872], II, 258.) It is somewhat surprising that in this heyday of ritual criticism, critics have largely ignored Simrock's suggestion that Macbeth plays the loser in a ritual or legend symbolizing the processes of vegetation.

Simrock could have made a stronger case had he pointed to a curious succession of images which describe Macbeth and Malcolm in terms of a legendary cycle of vegetation-kings. The sequence begins when Banquo and Macbeth first meet the witches and Banquo bids them

... looke into the Seedes of Time,
And say, which Graine will grow, and which will not.
Then, when Duncan greets Macbeth, he assures him,

I haue begun to plant thee, and will labour
To make thee full of growing.

Before Duncan's murder, Lady Macbeth urges her husband to "looke like th'innocent flower." After the murder, Banquo describes himself as "the Roote" of many kings, and Macbeth, bemoaning his "fruitlesse Crowne," bemoans also the fate that will make "the Seedes of Banquo Kings." When the witches make the Birnam wood prophecy, Macbeth not unnaturally identifies his own fate with that of the trees:

Who can impresse the Forrest, bid the Tree
Vnfixe his earth-bound Root?

And shortly thereafter, Malcolm says, "Macbeth / Is ripe for shaking." The young Prince is the new "Soueraigne Flower," while Macbeth says of himself, autumnally,

My way of life
Is faine into the Seare, the yellow Leafe.

Then, Birnam wood, the image of the Flower-lord, the May-king, comes marching; Macbeth is killed, and Malcolm turns to those things, "Which would be planted newly with the time." In short, Macbeth takes on the tone of an "old king," representing the winter of the year past, who has made the "Greene one, Red"; Malcolm plays the spring of the new year.

In a play so much concerned with the succession of kings and the relation of one generation to the next, this sequence of images makes Simrock's suggestion seem quite fitting: the vegetable qualities of a legendary year-king have been grafted onto Macbeth's rise and fall. One swallow, of course, does not make a summer, nor a handful of images a theme, but Macbeth fairly bristles with images of vegetation. They relate to the natural processes of generation, procreation, and succession which the Macbeths' murders so rudely violate. In all of Shakespeare's histories, the land is compared to a garden and the succession of kings to a family "tree." (See Caroline Spurgeon, Shakespeare's Imagery [Cambridge, Eng., 1952], pp. 216-225.) Macbeth, however, brings these vegetation images, like so many things from the early histories, to a harvest of richness and precision. Scotland is seen as a wasteland, "our Graue," where

good mens liues
Expire before the Flowers in their Caps.

The defeat of Macbeth takes on some of the aura of a sacred ritual cleansing of that wasteland: the old and sterile king with all the accumulated sin of his year's reign is sacrificed and replaced by a new fertility and innocence, the virginal Malcolm, "a Childe Crowned, with a Tree in his hand."

In finding in Macbeth and Malcolm this overtone of ritual, we need attribute to Shakespeare no preternatural knowledge of either the bosky acres of Germanic folklore or the uncouth forest of Sir James Frazer's sacrificial kings. For one thing, the wandering of Birnam wood came into the play from Holinshed's folkloristic chronicle. For another, as C. L. Barber has pointed out in Shakespeare's Festive Comedy (Princeton, N. J., 1959), such a "rite of May" as the carrying of green boughs or a "green man" was common in sixteenth-century England. (Barber cites, among other things, Stubbes' Anatomie of Abuses, numerous accounts of Queen Elizabeth's being feted as a "supreme summer lady," Nashe's Summer's Last Will and Testament, Herrick's "Corinna's Going a-Maying," and "Maye" of The Shepheardes Calender.) Shakespeare undoubtedly knew such rituals first-hand and knew they symbolized cycles of sterility and fecundity. In writing Macbeth and thinking of fertility, the cycles of generation, and the ways one king succeeds another, his images would naturally, almost phototropically, turn to the agricultural customs of his own green youth. N. N. H.

LITERATURE AND THE INDIVIDUAL READER

By literature I intend here all those writings, whether in prose or verse form, and whether written in past or present time, that are felt by us to-day as having value — value not as informative merely, but as satisfying some demand of the imaginative life. This definition requires, I think, some indication of what I intend by the ambiguous pronoun 'we', 'us'.

In the Preface to that collection of "Essays in Criticism" that Professor Trilling has entitled The Opposing Self, he has spoken of each essay as intending to say "what makes a particular book or author interesting and valuable to us", and refers to the 'coherence' deriving always from an author's notion of the 'us' for whom he is writing. In another collection, A Gathering of Fugitives, he makes more explicit his own notion of the 'us' he has in mind. He was fortunate, he says, in being able to assume in his readers a preference for fiction that "is not ephemeral", for writings that have psychological, philosophic or historical interest. To such an audience it is possible, he says, to speak somewhat informally, "personally, even autobiographically", telling of the interest he himself felt in the work he was discussing.

I have quoted from these prefaces because, in writing this article for Literature and Psychology, I think I may also assume in any reader interests such as those Trilling mentions, enabling me, like him, to speak personally of literary values. Indeed I think I may assume in those for whom I write a further common interest, in the relation between values felt and individual needs as these are understood in the light of present-day psychological studies. It is to those possessing such an interest that I am venturing to speak, as Trilling says, "even autobiographically", indicating the way in which my own studies and experience have led me to think of the relation between a literary work and a reader.

1.

First I want to speak of those writings that appeal to us by their sound — their rhythm or word-music. /1 Here I will refer to an incident reported in the account of his childhood by Edmund Gosse, an incident which has always seemed to me of peculiar interest as illumining the power on a sensitive hearer of this quality in relative isolation from other values.

Gosse tells how, as a little boy, he was set, under his father's eye, to memorize Latin grammar. The father on one occasion had taken up his beloved Virgil and began, unmindful of the child, "to murmur and to chant the adorable verses by memory". "O Papa, what is that?" cried the child, and the verses were translated and explained, arousing little interest. "But a miracle had been revealed to me, the incalculable, the amazing beauty which would exist in the sound of verses... and the magic of it took hold of my heart forever." /2

Something of the same incantatory power may be present in prose rhetoric. A friend tells me that in his early school days in a country school in Ireland, the most valuable influence he received was from a reading-book containing passages from great historical speeches. Sometimes, while he was supposed to be engaged in other lessons, these passages would be read aloud by the master or an older pupil, and he, quite unable to comprehend their

1/ It is hard to name this quality accurately, since it may be appreciated by a reader as a motor, rather than an auditory, image; it lays hold of the speech organ and is echoed silently.

2/ Father and Son (Heinemann, 1910) pp. 168-69.

significance for adults, would still be compelled to listen, fascinated by their sound.

That a young child may be peculiarly sensitive to this element of verbal music is suggested by the fact that passages of verse or rhythmical prose that become familiar in childhood — passages from the Bible, or hymns or mere jingling rhymes — remain in the memory and recur, even tiresomely, far into adult life. A second phase of heightened sensitivity, to sound and meaning together, may occur, perhaps at adolescence; and this period, if poetry is then enjoyed with passion, may so affect the organism — body and mind — that it is unlikely in later life to respond at all fully to the rhythms that are fascinating to a younger generation. Also, differences between individuals in the degree in which the musical element enters their response to poetry may help to determine manner of response, and so the order of our preferences among poets. For instance, in my individual hierarchy, Milton would be placed much higher than he stands in the estimation of such fine critics as T. S. Eliot and F. R. Leavis.

My own delight in Milton's poetry had been preceded by keen enjoyment of the music of Tennyson; but at the same time when perhaps the need for expression through poetry was greatest, it was through Milton's poetry that I satisfied it. I recall holidays among Swiss mountains: the reading and memorizing of Milton's poetry during long solitary walks. Then it was between me and lines from Paradise Lost — as Gosse says of lines from the Aeneid lodged in his childish memory — all my inner being used to ring with their sound.

Commenting on the use of the term 'music' with reference to Milton's poetry, Dr. Leavis emphasizes the difference between "musician's music" and the music of verse. In verse it is meaning that gives "the 'sound' its body, movement and quality". This is true, I think, even in my instance of the sound that fascinated the young Gosse. When the older Gosse repeated lines loved and understood, he, in a manner, 'enacted' something of the thoughts, and feeling put into them by Virgil, and something of that feeling and some shadow of thought would be caught in with the sound by the young listener.

On the word-music of Paradise Lost Leavis comments that its rhythm is lulling, relaxing. We have a feeling of exalted significance and are ready to tolerate vagueness and inconsistency of imagery and conception. He quotes Professor Waldock's comment on the lack of balance in the poem because of the way in which Satan appears in the earlier books as a hero, with whom the poet seems allied, later as a devil whom the poet delights to show humiliated, degraded. Neither is the hell of Paradise Lost consistently realized. Described as a place of continual torment, it appears, incompatibly, as an assembly-ground, a base where military operations can be planned with little inconvenience.

All this seems true and disparaging, so long as we regard Milton's story as a recital of imagined happenings within the space and time of our material universe. But another way of realizing the poem better corresponds with the feelings of value that almost all readers experience — even those critics who notice the vagueness of the imagery. If the poem is essentially a rendering in symbol of a conflict present in the mind of the poet, present also in some form in the mind of the responsive reader, then those inconsistencies, unions of opposites, noted by the poet's critics, have their function. To himself a man may be both a hero aspiring to Deity, and, in another aspect, a creature helpless before the might of destiny, or, perhaps, abhorrent even to himself before the holiness of God. The place of this long conflict of many aspects is that same region of which Marlowe's Mephistopheles, talking with Faust in apparent freedom, could say: "Why, this is Hell, nor am I out of it". Not incompatibly is

this inner region of torment a place where demonic forces can assemble and devise strategic operations. That strong music of Milton's verse, carrying the burden of all this conflict, has indeed an influence turning away attention from the things and images of outward sense, that, so much the more, we may listen to the poet as, lighted inwardly, according to his prayer, he tells "of things invisible".

I think it is in times when we participate in the meaningful music of great poetry—music such as that of Milton, or of Shakespeare in culminating passages of his tragedies—that we may come nearest to verifying in individual experience Jung's hypothesis concerning archetypes. At such times there is relief from personal aims and anxieties, and consciousness seems enlarged to contain more of the universal. The responsive reader or listener may divine and share something of the creative ecstasy of the poet.

An interesting passage in Pasternak's Doctor Zhivago /3/ describes the effect on one whose gift and vocation was for poetry when, even in the midst of danger and distress, "his work", the power of poetic composition, took possession of him. It was as if "the thought and poetry of the world" controlled him. He was but "the pivot" upon which this mighty force was moving, and by it he was "for a time relieved of self-reproach, of dissatisfaction with himself, of the sense of his own nothingness."

It seems to me significant that here deliverance is from "the sense of one's own nothingness". The contrast is between the greatness in which it is possible to participate and the little anxious self from whose pettiness one is for the time freed. This contrast seems to me true of the experience of tragedy as one may know it, reader or spectator, at the close of Hamlet or King Lear. Individual thought and feeling is controlled by energies of the human spirit having a form which may be termed archetypal, as governed by the very conditions of human existence. Disaster and death are felt as incidents in a life that is self-renewing, and implies all that we mean by the devilish and the Divine.

2.

I wish at this point to say something concerning response to the tragic story related in the New Testament.

The story of the life and death of Jesus is indeed not tragic when interpreted in accordance with Christian dogma. If it is postulated, and actually believed, that Jesus was in the fullest sense incarnate Deity, there can be in this divine protagonist no flaw or blindness leading to disaster; and that conflict with the powers of evil, so vividly presented in words attributed to Jesus, can be no real contest, since the issue is decided from the beginning by Omnipotence. /4/ But this is not the way in which the story is read by one who approaches it, not as an authoritative document of Christian faith, but as a valued part of our literary heritage.

To me it seems important for those of us who are agnostic in our outlook on the universe to consider what is our attitude to the writings that make up the Old and New Testaments, particularly the Gospel story. That these writings have literary value, and have in their translated form entered deeply into the literary

3/ Translation by Hayward and Harari (Collins and Harvill Press, 1958), pp. 391-92.

4/ I accept this argument from Mr. Hyman's essay, "Psychoanalysis and the Climate of Tragedy" (Freud and the 20th Century, Allen and Unwin, 1958) though it seems to me likely that in reading the story many Christians think of Jesus as waging a real conflict with evil, his foresight limited by the blindness inevitable in the human condition. Thus a tragic reversal is present in the story, from the hopefulness of the earlier mission.

tradition of all English-speaking people, can hardly be questioned; and one way of simplifying the task of the literary critic in regard to them is to concentrate upon "the instrumental qualities" of the language — such qualities as "clarity, precision of outline, economy of substance, and the graces of the cadence". /5

But such criticism is not adequate when we attempt to consider, in the light of present-day psychological writings, some features of the various responses of readers to literature. This unique literature that has affinities to epic and tragic poetry, to history, to philosophy and theology, sets a task that is indeed formidable to the psychological critic.

The most that I can do here is to indicate one distinction that seems to me important, among readers approaching this literature from an agnostic standpoint. The response of such readers will be different according to whether the question of the existence of God is for them a live issue. The reader unable to recognize any constraining evidence for the presence of deity in the world may still have a sense of something in the nature of man that makes the question a valid and urgent one.

In the view of human nature expressed in the writings of Freud there appears no basis for entertaining any question concerning deity. The idea of God is explained by reference to the child's early experience of the relation to its parents. Such conceptions as that of the Kingdom of God, with such faith in its coming as dominates the recorded life of Jesus, must be regarded, by one who shares the outlook of Freud, as wish-fulfilment generated from impulses of the animal nature. Thought of any 'soul', or spirit, in man of a different order from his material, animal nature must be rejected as an illusion, idle superstition or philosophic error.

For the problem of the ultimate nature of man, no solution is provided by scientific investigation. The writings of Freud are not merely a statement of discovered facts, but also — as one writer has described them — "a body of speculative insights", /6 and such insights, another writer has observed, have "a quality of irresistible immediacy" /7.

It is this irresistible immediacy characterizing our individual visions, or intuitions, of the self that makes these intuitions, and so our responses to some forms of literature, differ so profoundly. To some of us it appears as an irresistible insight that the 'I' that knows and judges, in however limited a fashion, is distinct from the body with which it is so inexplicably united; and this strange quality of the knower and the known within ourselves serves as basis for the question whether, in the universe we know as material, there exists, in some mysterious relation, an unknown, greater 'I', whom we address as Thou, to whom ultimately, as spiritual beings we are akin.

To one for whom this 'insight' and the questioning to which it leads, is inevitable, the recorded life and death of Jesus, and its effect in the recorded lives and thought of St. Paul and others, has deep significance. Beneath the imaginative rendering of the story we glimpse the historic person who had power, both in his lifetime and through his recorded life and death, to awaken in others that sense of communion with Deity in which he himself lived. Those who entertain Jung's hypothesis of archetypal images

5/ Mr. T. R. Henn has examined, under this limitation, two passages from the Bible, in "Lectures on Poetry designed (in the main) for Science Students," under the title The Apple and the Spectroscope (Methuen, 1951).

6/ S. E. Hyman, Op. Cit., p. 166.

7/ Abraham Kaplan, "Freud and Modern Philosophy" (Freud and the 20th Century), p. 209

stirring deep response will recognize the rebirth pattern pre-eminently in the tragic story of the crucifixion, followed by faith in a resurrection /8, wakened in innumerable lives.

To such readers that instinctive consent to death of which Freud wrote appears, both here and in other great tragic dramas, in a light different from that in which it has been regarded by some students of Freud. Commenting upon the impulse toward death as expressed in the death scene of Sophocles' Cedipus Coloneus, Professor Trilling has noted /9 that here, as elsewhere in poetic presentation, the imaged death may readily be interpreted as apotheosis, or a passing to some new kind of existence. To me this seems constantly true of Shakespearean tragedy, and any suggestion of death as extinction in punishment for wrong doing is subordinate to a sense of death as release, escape. Certainly when Othello turns his sword upon himself, or Brutus cries that Caesar's ghost may now be still, the idea of retribution is present; yet, more powerful, I think, within the experience is the sense of release. To me the completed tragedy recalls the lines in which a poet has described those heroes of tragic story—

...who panted toward their end, and fell on death
Even as the sobbing runner breasts the rope.

The attitude of the awed spectator is expressed, I think, most fully in the majestic lines closing the tragedy of King Lear:

.....O! let him pass; he hates him
That would upon the rack of this tough world
Stretch him out longer.

3.

I must not, in view of the intention of this article, claim more space, or not much more, to discuss distinctions of individual response to prose fiction. If it had been possible I should like to have made some attempt at answering a few questions that interest me in regard to this form of literature. Here I can only indicate some of the questions and lines of thought I should like to have followed further.

First, what is the main difference in one's response to a good novel from that to an epic or dramatic poem, forms that have also a story to tell? What in the novel replaces, in its effect on one's imaginative life, the influence of poetry's word-music? Is it, in some cases, the cumulative effect of homely detail, making the persons and situations portrayed more near and familiar to us?

Is it possible to indicate some of the differences in the kind of demand made upon a novel by different readers, and thus partly account for the extreme differences often found among even serious, educated readers in their judgments concerning the value and interest of a novel?

Would one of these differences be the degree in which a reader desires to know himself and others truly? Could one make use, in regard to the modern analytic type of novel, of Kenneth Burke's suggestion of overlapping strategies? For instance, the novels of C. P. Snow analyze the life-strategies of one man, the narrator; how he responds to different situations that arise in the course of his interactions with others, and through reflective

8/ An agnostic, reading or contemplating the resurrection story with "a willing suspension of disbelief", will enter imaginatively the astonished rapture of the disciples in the bodily presence of their risen master. Then follows—or operates within the imaginative response—a more reflective and individual reaction according to whatever faith in spiritual renewal is possible to the reader.

9/ In Freud and the Crisis of our Culture (Beacon Press, 1955), p. 26.

awareness of such interactions comes to know himself. Does one's interest in such a novel depend upon one's readiness to compare, half-consciously or reflectively, these imaged strategies of interaction with one's own, recognizing — as Snow's narrator freely does — unacceptable feelings and impulses as well as those permissible?

Have the psychological writings of Freud, and others, concerning the complexity and ambivalence of our impulses and feelings, and the penetration of this teaching into modern fiction, journalism and other writings, so modified the attitudes of educated readers that the rigorous censorship of which Freud wrote is no longer prevalent? Should we, if this is so, think oftener of impulses, undeveloped or frustrate through the conditions of life, consciously finding relief and fuller understanding through the reading of fiction, rather than of "repressed" impulses indulged during the reading unconsciously?

These and other such questionings that cannot here be pursued must await development in some more adequate treatment of individual response to literature.

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NEWS BRIEFS

* * At the Annual Spring Meeting of the Greater New York Regional of CEA, devoted to panel discussions on "An Interdisciplinary Approach to Teaching Literature," the panel on Literature and Psychology consisted of Mr. Simon O. Lesser of NBC, Professor Paul C. Obler of Drew, and your Editor. The discussion was lively and the audience response both searching and enthusiastic.

* * An ACLS Fellowship — project, a biography of Thomas Love Peacock — has been awarded to our former Associate Editor, Dr. Eleanor L. Nicholes. In April she departed for France and Great Britain. We stand to profit from her new-found leisure, for she carried in her baggage a copy of Professor Wasserstrom's Heiress of the Ages, which she has promised to review for us.

* * Professor Fraiberg recently completed a series of three lecture-discussions for the New Orleans Psychoanalytic Training Center as part of a course given to about-to-graduate candidates in their last year, on applications of psychoanalysis to various fields. His sessions were devoted to psychoanalysis and aesthetics, with special attention to literature.

* * Dr. Harry Bergholz has sent us a cutting from Publishers' Weekly for April 4, 1960, in which Richard Ellmann is reported as having been asked why he didn't attempt a psychoanalytic biography of Joyce. His reply: that "if in his 'Growth of the Imagination' chapter," he hadn't "interpreted" Joyce, it could be said "that I haven't written a modern biography.

* * New and renovated journals: MASS. REV., qtrly., Univ. Mass., \$4.00 - WISCONSIN STUDIES IN CONTEMP. LIT., semi-annual, \$1.50 - STUDIES IN ENG. LIT. 1500-1900, qtrly., Rice Inst. (Texas), \$5.00 - A REVIEW OF ENG. LIT., qtrly., ed. by A. Norman Jaffares (Leeds Univ.), pub. at 59 New Oxford St., London W.C.1, \$3.00 - EXTRA-POLATION, mimeo newsletter of MLA Conference on Science Fiction, pub. at Coll. of Wooster, Ohio, \$1.00 - SYMPOSIUM, qtrly. incomp. lit. ed. by Dept. of Rom. Langs., Syracuse, pub. in new form and design by Syracuse Univ. Press, \$5.00

THOMAS MANN AND PSYCHO-ANALYSIS: THE TURNING-POINT

Niemand bleibt ganz der er
ist, indem er sich erkennt. /1

The relationship between Thomas Mann's devious psychology and psycho-analysis, between his so-called "new humanism" and the dry moralism of Sigmund Freud has been so close and intimate that many of Mann's critics and commentators have merely taken it for granted. Certainly during the perilous years that saw the end of the Weimar Republic, Mann wrote two major essays on his great contemporary that were at once an affirmation of his own new-won democratic views, and an identification with the ideas of the founder of psycho-analysis: "Die Stellung Freuds in der modernen Geistesgeschichte" (1929) and "Freud und die Zukunft" (1936). But it would be well to look more closely into what Mann really understood by psycho-analysis, to inquire more exactly when he became acquainted with it and when he came to approve it, and to scrutinise the gap between that acquaintance and that approval — for gap there was, as we shall show.

In a sense, the two men were literary contemporaries; the same year, 1900, saw the appearance of young Thomas Mann's first novel, *Buddenbrooks*, and the first major work of the mature analyst, *Die Traumdeutung*. From then on, psycho-analysis became part of the climate of literary opinion. However, it was not until Mann's own middle life that he came directly to grips with it, and even then, there was a remarkable ambiguity in his attitude.

The forces in his youth urging him towards psycho-analysis were many. The literary world, naturalist and symbolist, was ready for it, and Mann himself was a writer with a foot in each camp. The psychology of his mentors Nietzsche and Schopenhauer turned him in that direction, and his entire *oeuvre* seemed to follow: he knew the significance of the parent figures; he brooded on the artist's necessary renunciation of life; he was aware of the subordination of the intellect to the will, or the unconscious; he was preoccupied with the tension of living and dying that together made up life; the detail of his own keen, devious "debunking" psychology was close to Freud's unmasking of self-deception. Wagner's associative musical technique, which had become the formal principle of his own narrative style, lent itself easily to conveying psychological associations. Everything carried him towards psycho-analysis. And yet... and yet... he did not accept it easily or immediately. Just after *Der Zauberberg* was published (1924) a number of Mann's smaller essays broach the topic directly, or touch upon it in the course of an argument, but the general picture they offer is exceedingly equivocal: a concession to psycho-analysis in one place is cancelled by a reservation elsewhere; an admission is called into question by the uneasiness of the tone in which it is made. So contradictory are Mann's own statements, that it is exceedingly difficult to establish with any precision when he first became acquainted with psycho-analysis. "My relationship to psycho-analysis is as complicated as it deserves," /2 he says, and that seems to set the tone.

What were the objections that Mann raised to psycho-analysis in these years? They may throw light on the curious survival of his old ironic distress at psychological insight, his old *Erkenntnis*. They seem to be based on two issues, social and aesthetic. During the 1920's, when Freudian ideas began to spread beyond austere medical circles, they frequently fell into the hands of unsavoury cranks, of the Krokowski type, which did them

1/ Thomas Mann, *Pariser Rechenschaft* (Berlin, 1926), p. 112. Translations of all succeeding quotations are by the author of this paper.

2/ "Mein Verhältnis zur Psychoanalyse," *Almanach der Psychoanalyse* 1926.

little credit. They became involved and confused in a great many suspect and irrational trains of thought, and came to imply the same dubious atmosphere as clung to the masculine mysticism of the circle of Stefan George, Hans Blüher's studies in homosexuality, the questionable pretensions of the characterology of a Ludwig Klages or a Hans Prinzhorn. All this Mann found more than distasteful; he thought it dangerous, and in a short article, „Mein Verhältnis zur Psychoanalyse," written in 1925 at the special request of the Freudian circle itself, and seemingly his first utterance on the subject, he said so. His objection is made, typically, as an afterthought. First he praises its bold clear-sightedness, but then withdraws, making a very considerable reservation:

In psycho-analysis, this remarkable outgrowth of the modern scientific mind, we are justified in seeing something great and admirable, a bold discovery, a deep forward thrust of perception, an astounding, indeed a sensational, extension of our knowledge of man. But on the other hand, we may well find that, over-publicised and abused, it can become an instrument of malicious enlightenment, a mania for debunking and discrediting, dangerous to our deep cultural roots; and to have doubts about this aspect of it does not necessarily mean mere sentimentality. ¹³

Its popularisation and misuse was something Mann could not look upon with approval. In Der Zauberberg he satirised this tendency in the figure of Dr. Krokowski, and many years later, in Doktor Faustus, in the figure of the irrationalist, Dr. Chaim Breisacher. Insofar as these two novels represent the decline of the European intellectual world, psycho-analysis abused plays no small role in hastening the decay.

The second objection Mann had to psycho-analysis was more profoundly personal, affecting him where he was most sensitive: it concerned the nature of the artist. "It [psycho-analysis] is in essence understanding, melancholy understanding, especially when it concerns art and the nature of the artist." ¹³ Elsewhere and in the same year he says,

As an artist I must confess that I am not wholly satisfied with Freud's ideas: rather, I feel myself disturbed and belittled by them. After all, Freud's ideas penetrate the artist like X-rays, right down to destroying the secret of his creativity. ¹⁴

Now the nature of the artist has always been Thomas Mann's own peculiar problem, and he has felt it to be a moral problem. Coming from a background of powerful mercantile Protestant morality, he cannot but feel distressed at the sovereign transcendence of art over all other categories. The formula, by now almost a cliché, for his kind of artist is the "artist with the bad conscience." It would seem that while in other spheres he was ready to recognise the value of psycho-analysis, in this one respect he was still reluctant. The revival of the old Erkenntnisekel, the advances and withdrawals, acceptances and hesitations, so evident in the essays of 1925, probably indicate a struggle with psycho-analysis, and with himself, on this issue. Moreover, he fears that knowledge of the source of art will destroy his art, just as insight into life has made his artist unfit for life. The X-ray metaphor is a significant indication of his distaste, for it recalls the consulting-room of Krokowski the analyst in Der Zauberberg, the psychical counterpart to Behrens' X-ray chamber, where the most questionable hocus-pocus with the occult also went on. But Mann

3/ Ibid.

4/ "Thomas Mann und die Psychoanalyse," Int. Ztschr. f. Ps., XI (1925), 247.

is unrelenting in his determination that some reckoning must be made. In tortuous and tormented sentences he recalls Aschenbach, in Der Tod in Venedig, who deliberately and heroically refused perception if it threatened to inhibit activity, and who closed his eyes to unwelcome knowledge. But this, Mann says now, signifies "nothing less than the illusion that, by shutting its eyes, the world can ever, as the saying is, 'get round' the results of the research of Freud and his followers. It most certainly will not get round them. Nor will art do so." ⁴⁵ The reckoning must certainly be made, but as yet he finds it difficult to make wholly. This passage shows Mann right on the horns of his dilemma: on the one hand nostalgia for the old rejection of insight; on the other the certain knowledge that the perception and understanding provided by psycho-analysis, however unpalatable, must be honestly confronted, even with regard to the artist, the point where he is most vulnerable.

This melancholy and ironical uneasiness at his own understanding, which Mann called Erkenntnis, goes back further in his career than Der Tod in Venedig (1911). He refers it to the period in his life which in his second essay on Freud, "Freud und die Zukunft" (1938), he calls "my Nietzsche-Hamlet-Tonio Kröger-period." And Tonio Kröger was written in 1903. Perhaps a brief study of the problems implied in this Novelle — "mein Eigenstes", as he once called it — will show why the Erkenntnis should have persisted so long as far as psycho-analysis was concerned, although such a study involves the delicate task of deducing an author's spiritual biography from his work.

"To be a poet means to stand in judgement on oneself" was the motto from Ibsen, much in keeping with psycho-analysis, that Mann placed at the head of the volume of Novellen in which Tonio Kröger was first published, and he has made no secret of the strong autobiographical element in this portrait of the artist as a young man. This may perhaps justify our own biographical approach to it. The streets of Mann's own native town of Lübeck form the background of the Novelle; we learn from Mann's autobiographical sketch that there was a real Hans Hansen whom as a boy he had loved; even the incident of Tonio Kröger's arrest when he returns to his old home is not invented, but really occurred to the author. These details, however, are slight in comparison with the profound personal dilemma in Tonio's psychology itself.

In brief, the Novelle presents the dilemma of the writer who is unable to be at ease with the careless aestheticism of his art, which by its nature transcends the limitations, responsibilities and tensions of everyday life. Metaphysically, Mann's artist is a traveller in the realms of death and suspension of being; physically, this is symbolised by the presence of disease within him; psychologically, it has its correlative in his ineptitude in normal society, his vain love of life and sorrowing awareness of his alienation from it. Now in Tonio Kröger, this gulf is widened by a sense of guilt. He experiences the autonomous amorality of art as explicitly immoral. He is the artist with the bad conscience. This sense of the artist's inadequacy before life is already in keeping with Freud's idea of art as a compensatory activity. What brings the Novelle still closer to Freudian theory, however, are the symbolic terms in which Mann presents the bad conscience with which this uneasy artist regards his sullen craft. The moral world he feels answerable towards is the bourgeois world of his native town, summarised and summed up in the symbolic figure of his father.

The contrast between the decency of ethical life and the wild and irresponsible vagabondage of the artist, who knows death, the contrast central to the Novelle, finds its clearest symbol in the contrast between Tonio's parents, the correct and reserved father from the North, and the irresponsible and musical mother from the South. Tonio is torn between his love for his mother and the hidden admission that his father was right. His father is for him

his good conscience. And this conscience, symbolised by the father, is with him all his life: "And so he fell into adventures of the flesh, plunged down into sensuality and guilt, and suffered unutterably through it. Perhaps it was the inheritance of his father in him... that made him suffer thus." /6 This is a conflict of allegiances on the same pattern as the Oedipus situation, which is at the heart of Freud's entire theory. Naturalistically, the young Tonio Kröger might be described as painfully unable to make his way completely towards vicarious satisfaction by unconscious self-identification with his father, acknowledging and approving his authority. He recognises his father as the symbol of authority and morality, and even shares his views, but he still clings to his mother, and cannot give up the artistic way of life she has encouraged in him. All his life, it is her way he follows — but with the constant inward reminder of his father's disapproval. And this shift too, from external authority to inward conscience, is also Freudian.

But Tonio Kröger is far from being a merely naturalistic tale; its strength is that it is realistic and symbolic at the same time. This is conveyed by the structure of the Novelle in which the Leitmotif is repeated and developed in the course of the narration, being progressively stripped of its naturalistic connotations and coming to stand as a symbol. The figures of Tonio Kröger's father and mother, as well as being in naturalistic-psychological terms the cause of Tonio's adult dilemma, are at the same time the symbols of the dilemma of the mature artist caught between conflicting demands of morality and aestheticism. There is little need to dwell on the autobiographical nature of this dilemma. It is well-known that Tonio's parental situation is a stylization of Mann's own: his father was the respected senator; his mother the stranger from South America who never became completely part of the Lübeck world. It would not be an exaggeration to say that every one of Mann's artist-figures, from Hanno Buddenbrook to Adrian Leverkühn, is given a similar parentage. For to Mann himself, the philosophical problem of art is experienced and rendered in terms of the psychological problem of the artist. This, then, was Tonio's bourgeois bad conscience that allowed him no joy in his artistic insight; this was the understanding that made him incapable of any close relationship with the children of life whom he loved. This was Mann's own Erkenntnisekel.

It may now perhaps be clear why Mann remained hesitant about psycho-analysis for so long. It came far too close to him on the very problem that lay at the heart of his life and work: the relation of art to morality, or of the artist to the bourgeois world of his fathers. Mann would only be able to accept psycho-analysis as part of a wider change in his view of the world, in which the old antitheses could in some measure be reconciled.

That he did at last attain a new sense of harmony with his Lübeck background is amply witnessed by a speech he made there in 1926, when he returned to share the 700th anniversary of the town's foundation. It is a speech of conciliation with the "Bürger" town he had once so lovingly satirised — and outraged — a quarter of a century earlier. It is an acknowledgment of his roots and his parentage. But the remarkable thing about this recognition is that he uses the language and reaches the conclusions of psycho-analysis. The tone is a little apologetic, it is true, but the context is a recollection of Tonio Kröger:

What I had written as a young man in Buddenbrooks, I had written as it were at random, unconsciously.... But today we know about the powers of the unconscious and to what a great extent the really decisive things come from this essential source, called by philosophy 'the will,' and controlled by the intellect only with difficulty and after the event. There came the day and the hour when I understood that the apple never falls far from the tree;

that as an artist I was far more 'genuine,' much more an apple from the Lübeck tree than I had dreamed. . . . 27

And again later,

How often in life I have observed with a smile — caught myself at it — that it was really the personality of my dead father that was acting as the secret model for what I had done or left undone. 27

When Mann can say that, he has come a long way toward a sympathetic understanding of the Freudian Oedipus situation; and indirectly, has come a long way towards reconciling the two poles, of Lübeck on the one hand, and its melancholy stylization Buddenbrooks on the other.

And this only a year after he had said so regretfully of psycho-analysis, "It is in essence understanding, melancholy understanding, especially when it concerns art and the nature of the artist." There is no need to suggest that Mann had undergone a radical conversion in the short interval: this is probably just one more instance of the ambivalence he shows towards psycho-analysis in this period. Mann knows that he cannot ignore psycho-analysis. In the passages quoted from the Lübeck speech he has come a long way towards recognising it, and Schopenhauer's concept of "will" has helped him to do so. But he has still not entirely fitted it into a pattern of thought that will allow him to avow it wholeheartedly. This does not come until he fully apprehends and articulates the duality of its nature; that is, not until his first full salutation of Freud in 1929, "Die Stellung Freuds in der modernen Geistesgeschichte."

But meanwhile it has given him the terms in which he could acknowledge the bourgeois world of his fathers. The passage quoted suggests that there had in the interim been a time of decision and revision for Mann, and gives some indication of when that might have been. "There came the day and the hour. . ." The phrase is a recollection of Mann's literary contribution to the 1914-1918 war: Die Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen, a series of essays written throughout the course of the war and gathered together under that title in 1918; and his study of Frederick the Great, Friedrich und die grosse Koalition (1914), which bore the sub-title Ein Aufsatz für den Tag und die Stunde (An Essay for the Day and the Hour). The latter is an historical study written out of the urgency of his own contemporary German situation, and is not without parallels between Prussia's young assertive power in the eighteenth century, hemmed in by the Grand Coalition, and the position of Germany in 1914, confronted by the alliance of the rest of Europe. It is also, incidentally, a keen psychological study of Frederick himself, indirect and probing, indeed, attracting the attention of the analyst Hitschmann in Imago. Mann's interpretation of the historical situation of Prussia's rising aggressiveness too, was psycho-analytic: another variant of the conflict between the generations, it represented the aggression of the young country as self-defence against the ancient dynasties around it. This was the kind of paradoxical psychology typical of Mann's writing, but it was also a piece of avowed special pleading to disguise the German aggression of 1914 also as self-defence.

It is less easy to describe in brief the polemics of Die Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen. It began as an assertion of the German cultural tradition, as Mann in his love of country conceived it. It developed as a bitter debate with those German intellectuals who had given their allegiance to the French republican tradition — foremost among whom was his own elder brother the novelist Heinrich Mann; and it became Mann's own highly personal

2/ Thomas Mann, "Lübeck als geistige Lebensform, Rede gehalten zur 700-Jahr-Feier der Freien und Hanse-Stadt im Stadttheater zu Lübeck," Die Forderung des Tages (Berlin, 1930), pp. 36-37; 38.

coming-to-terms with the political events and intellectual trends before and during the first world war. The tone is anguished and more intemperate than anything else Mann has written. Buried in the hurly-burly, the naive resentments and newspaper headlines of contemporary polemics, is a painful self-search, a dialectic apologia pro vita sua. It becomes an examination of his own past — an examination in historical and philosophical, not psychological terms — but then, as the companion piece on Frederick the Great shows, Mann's understanding of history is largely psychological.

...searching in books, in the distress of the age searching after one's furthest origins, after one's legitimate foundations, after the hard-driven self's oldest inheritance of mind, searching for justification....

Who am I? where do I come from that I should be as I am, and would not have it otherwise? That is what one is searching for in times of affliction of soul.... I am a townsman, a burgher, child and great-grandchild of German burgher culture.... /8

It is a rediscovery of his origins, of the world of his fathers.

The events in the world make him realise his own intensely German quality, and how much he is the heir of the German nineteenth-century tradition, which, with Nietzsche, he characterises as "honest, but dark." He understands it in terms of his masters Nietzsche, Schopenhauer and Wagner; in terms of music, psychological honesty, the irony of the outsider, the "Bürger" way of life; in a word, of "Lübeck as a form of spiritual life." This he sets against what he calls the essentially French qualities of the shallow eighteenth-century enlightenment, social-democratic politics, and the rhetoric of the journalist. Constructed in unrelenting antitheses, Die Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen is the last cry of Thomas Mann, the "German-burgher-conservative," against the liberal, literary publicist, champion of France and the Enlightenment. Under Mann's hand, the antitheses swell and grow in associations, until, however arbitrarily, they have encompassed every intellectual trend in Europe under their several flags: Germany against France, understood as profundity against shallow enlightenment; that old pair of shadow-boxers, culture against civilization; the romantic nineteenth century against the clever eighteenth century; poetry against journalism; the artist against the publicist; a sense of the seriousness of life and death against trivial humanitarianism; the paternalistic state against the liberal-democratic state; Wagner against Zola; Thomas Mann against Heinrich Mann.

He sets himself to anatomise the German heritage he feels to be so much his own, and so much threatened. In the chapters "Einkehr" and "Bürgerlichkeit" he scrutinises his own past, and the world of his fathers that have made him: the Protestant, mercantile ethics of his patrician family; the pessimistic psychology of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer; the music and aestheticism of Wagner. But his analysis is highly ambivalent. His most Teutonic pages bristle with Fremdwörter borrowed from the French; with pain — or is it relief, confirmation, justification? — he points out how un-German in fact Nietzsche was, and Schopenhauer, and Wagner. He admits his own part in the breakdown of nineteenth-century ideals, his own debt to France and the eighteenth century. He recognises that his own very existence — he who had written about his Buddenbrook ancestors instead of living their ethical burgher life — is sign and symptom enough that their world is at an end.

8/ Thomas Mann, Die Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen, 19. bis 24. Aufl. (Berlin, 1922), p. 90. The work was written and published as a series of articles between 1915 and 1917, first appearing in book form in 1918.

Confronted with a time of crisis — and the forty-year-old Mann is fully aware that it is a time of personal as well as of historical European crisis — this book is an attempt to salvage and preserve his past, in face of the change he knows is inevitable and to which he knows he has made his contribution. It is a reckoning of what he will be able to take with him into the future, and what he will have to leave behind. The parting is reluctant; the book is both a rediscovery and articulation of his past, and a last, often strident, assertion of it; homesick, reactionary, valedictory.

This, then, is the day and the hour he refers to in his Lübeck speech, when he had come to assert his "Bürger" parentage. In his passionate reluctance to disavow the past, he felt a sense of solidarity with his fathers and fatherland which for the first time was unalloyed by Tonio Kröger's treacherous irony. The guilt of his own misgivings and betrayal of his "Bürger" world was sloughed off and transferred to his adversary. But his conflict with his brother was really a conflict with another aspect of himself.

Mann's passionate, belated identification with the world of his fathers showed the shadow-side of their morality too. He also gives voice to their complacent "sense of the seriousness of things." The specific issues are illuminating, particularly when we recall the very different views that Mann subsequently held. He urges the death penalty, for example, in the cause célèbre of Nurse Edith Cavell.

It meant... that out of humane feeling the idea of guilt was almost lost; indeed, that at times, under the weight of scientific opinion, we scarcely dared touch the criminal, and regarded capital punishment as the peak of inhumanity — whereas in the eyes of every serious man the idea of guilt bears not, it is true, a humanitarian stamp, but a most human one, and is by no means destroyed by any deterministic way of thinking; on the contrary, this only adds to its seriousness and solemnity. (p. 453)

This is the tortured style and tormented voice of Naphta, the conservative obscurantist of Der Zauberberg. And Mann himself, this precarious new-found bourgeois with his ceremonial respect for guilt, also lends his voice to the violent and ignorant repudiation of something very like psycho-analysis. The author of Friedrich und die grosse Koalition, that most psycho-analytical of historical essays, calls psycho-analysis "this Dionysian balderdash," and takes his adversary's psychological interpretation of history to task thus:

But when the German nation endured it [tyrannical rule], when — I quote — 'for generations it acquiesced in its humiliations,' then this was because (and your journalist's psychology goes very 'deep' now — in its own opinion it always goes 'deep' when it gets as far as sex and drags up a hodgepodge of Nietzsche and Krafft-Ebing) the cruelty of the tyrants 'responded to every perverse instinct.' It is clearly a case, as simple as it is repulsive, of an interaction of sadism on the one side and masochism on the other. (pp. 324-25)

And again, "...there is nothing on earth in which it [psychology] will not use 'psychological analysis' to discover and isolate dirt of the earth, earthy...." (p. 169) There is a kind of deliberate, polemical ignorance at work here. Mann must know that this kind of bludgeoning directed against his brother — and against Freud, the unnamed "hodgepodge of Nietzsche and Krafft-Ebing" — hits at his own essay on Frederick as well. There is pain in this blindness. And in addition to this intemperate abuse from the new found Bürger, a protest against "psychology" is made in the name of the sensitive artist's Erkenntnisekel too. Accusation is tempered by self-accusation:

Psychology discourages every stupidity and passion; it discourages life and art—through knowledge. For art becomes impossible—the artist becomes impossible—when they are seen through. The effect of psychology then is by no means to develop our culture; it is rather progressively destructive, producing intellectual-rational civilisation.... Of course, one can look at these things in a different way, but for the time being, and in their fashion, this ordering of things is incontrovertible. (p. 150)

This, then, was the point Mann had reached at the end of the war, and after his bitter self-struggle for an interpretation of his own history with regard to his fathers and his fatherland: a final, belated identification with them, even down to the least liberal detail of their views. The terms of conflict, it is true, are presented with exaggerated sharpness, for there is as much stylisation in the work as confession, but the final impression it leaves is one of valediction. Mann had articulated his attitude, and had freed himself to change it.

The Buddenbrooks world was strong within him. As a young man he had scrutinised it with the distance and mockery of art; Lübeck had responded with horror at the picture he portrayed. But this artist was never the total Bohemian and outcast; he kept his Bürger bad conscience. Der Tod in Venedig envisages the terrible consequences of repudiating it. In middle life, as an established writer, he came very close to the way of life he had once broken away from. So when the sudden crisis of the war burst upon him, it called forth in him a tremendous sense of identification with the once-rejected past (rejected still by his brother, his other self). The poise of the old ambivalence was broken down, and he threw all the weight of his rhetoric onto the Lübeck scale. This was the end of the old precarious, ironical solution, but it was not yet a new solution, only an interim stage on the way to one. The balance was reestablished later in the polarities of Der Zauberberg. In this novel, the old dualities are offered the possibility of synthesis into a greater whole in the famous "Man is the Master of Opposites." /9

This was the "new humanism" of Mann's middle years, in which his attempt at a compromise between antinomies emerged in his adoption of the attitudes of the "Zivilisationsliterat," but with a deeper foundation upon the Bürger cultural tradition. He threw off his sense of artistic isolation; he came to regard art as a reciprocal activity between artist and public. And so as an artist, and hence as a responsible citizen, he entered public affairs against his former reactionary desire to support the old régime. He honestly took back some of his more extreme reactionary claims. And all these repudiations of his romantic conservatism were made in the name of psycho-analysis. His first great essay on Freud was a speech in support of the Weimar republic. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud described the death impulse, the desire to return to an earlier, inorganic state, as conservative, and Mann was quick to exploit the political implications of the expression. In "Über die Ehe" (1925), for example, his description of conservatism is in terms of death and regression:

But the worst and the most false in all cases is the will to return to an earlier state of affairs. Our age, in horror at itself, is full of the wish for restoration, wishful dreaming for a return.... In vain, there is no going back. Every attempt at flight into outmoded historical forms creates only disease and untruth. /10

9/ Thomas Mann, Der Zauberberg (Berlin, 1924), II, 259.

10/ "Über die Ehe," p. 183. This essay was first published as one of many by several hands in the compilation Das Ehebuch, ed. Hermann, Graf Kayserling. Other contributors were Alfred Adler and C. G. Jung.

He even takes back his old attitude towards capital punishment and quite expressly calls on psycho-analysis to support him. In a short essay, "Über die Todesstrafe" (1926), he recalls his old conservative attitude, its justification of capital punishment as a recognition of the seriousness of life, and its refusal to share in any shallow and sentimental humanitarianism. But then he goes on to show a complete change of opinion: he now angrily condemns his former attitude as hypocritical, self-deceiving, even Fascist, and he calls to his help a long passage from Freud's anthropological treatise Totem and Tabu:

A little psycho-analysis! In his great treatise on Totem and Tabu, Freud says, 'If one member of the community has succeeded in satisfying the repressed desire, then the same desire must be alive in all his fellows. In order to control this temptation, the one who is actually envied must be destroyed and deprived of the fruit of his daring, and not infrequently the punishment gives its executors the opportunity to commit the same sinful deed themselves, justified as retribution.'

There you have it, hypocrites! No Fascist contempt for humanitarian reluctance to shed blood can prevent us from seeing through you; the idea that knowledge, understanding, is never to be allowed to inhibit life, will, action, passion, is a Fascist truth and a challenge we must go beyond, to the realisation that it is not the purpose of intellectual decision to give strength to stupidity, and that at a certain stage of cultural maturity and moral sensibility, the ritual killing of the miscreant by those 'who did not succeed' becomes a foul mockery, and humanly impossible. /11

This passage is important, for it marks not only one definite point where psycho-analysis helped to mould Mann's attitude, but also his emergence as an opponent of Fascism, attacking it in the name of psycho-analysis. However, he has said nothing of Thomas Mann the artist, and of his attitude toward psycho-analysis, but only of Thomas Mann, the new-found political man. His creativity is the one issue on which he continues to have reservations. Where it threatens to come too close to him as creative artist, he still withdraws. This was a point on which he was never easily reconciled to psycho-analysis, the probing into the sources of the artist's talent. As late as 1947, he takes up the cudgels in defence of the artist against the analyst's searching, in a letter about a certain psych-analytical study of Stifter and his work:

I have no doubt that previous criticism of Stifter has been too kindly and good-natured to do justice to its extremely strange and often quite frightening subject. But to see him now subjected to the strict psycho-analytical method is still not completely to my taste — not because I find this method lacking in respect, but because I cannot help feeling this point of view to be to some extent rather narrow. I would not like to see depth psychology applied as the one true method to all the great models of literature, and when I consider Sainte-Beuve's essay on Molière, quite innocent of sex-symbols and complexes, I feel happier. /12

However, apart from this one major reservation, it does seem that in the change in Mann's attitude that followed the dual reckoning of Die Betrachtungen and Der Zauberberg, psycho-analysis played no small part. Some time in the interval between the pub-

11/ Thomas Mann, "Über die Todesstrafe," Die Forderung des Tages, p. 386.

12/ Thomas Mann, in a letter dated 6.12.47 to Alfred, Freiherr von Winterstein, concerning the latter's psycho-analytical study of Adalbert Stifter. The present writer wishes to thank both writer and recipient for permission to quote.

lication of Die Betrachtungen and the completion of Der Zauberberg Mann transcended the point of identification with his Lübeck past which his bitter review had brought him to. He published little in the interim, but he did at this time begin his studies of Goethe, sovereign lord over antinomies, who was later to take the place of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer as his guide and model. His only publications were Goethe und Tolstoy (1922), a long critical discussion in which the stress is rather upon Tolstoy than upon Goethe, and two slight domestic idylls, Gesang vom Kindchen (1919), written in mock-Geothean hexameters, and Herr und Hund (1918), a prose account of Mann's dog Bauschan. While it seems clear enough that Mann's closer acquaintance with psycho-analytic theory after Der Zauberberg helped him to articulate his new-found humanism, Herr und Hund would suggest that his slighter knowledge of it at an earlier date helped him to move from the tormented avowal of his past to the vision of synthesis.

It is perhaps to give this quiet, absurd little sketch a quite disproportionate importance to suggest that it is in some sense a transition from Die Betrachtungen to Der Zauberberg. It is a resolution after discord, calm after crisis, and what is more, it has a serenity that persists in full consciousness of the "muddy ground, which is the ground of all life." ¹³ There is mockery in the little work, mockery of Hans Castorp, the simple young man who, like Bauschan, also has his wishful dreams and his years under medical care; mockery of Mann's own immediate past, and also mockery of psycho-analysis, which might have offered the terms of understanding it.

This agreeable, trivial little piece hides perhaps a deeper irony, for here introduced into the dog's inarticulate world are a number of hints at the workings of the unconscious mind which accord to a remarkable degree with Freud's analytic theory. Bauschan's restless growling sleep, it is suggested, hides dreams that fulfill vain desires of the day:

This dream life was all too obviously just an artificial substitute for real running and hunting which his nature created for him, because living with me did not allow him the joy of movement in the open to the extent that his blood and feeling required. (p. 250)

Mann even speculates along the lines of Jung's "Collective Unconscious," possibly anticipating Castorp's dream in the snow, but still in an ironic doggy context:

At his level surely, the life of the individual is separated more superficially from that of the species than in our case. Birth and death signify a less far-reaching shifting of existence. Perhaps the inheritance of his line is maintained more strongly, so that it is only an apparent contradiction to speak of inborn experiences, unconscious memories, which, once called forth, can confuse the creature about his own personal experiences and make him dissatisfied with them. (pp. 303-4)

There is even a hint at certain unconscious motives which were served by the apparently praiseworthy action of leaving Bauschan, who was sick, at the vet's for some weeks. But here too, the occasion of such remorseful introspection is so slight as to have an ironic effect:

And beyond this, was there perhaps involved the secret wish to be rid of him for a while, a certain curiosity and illegitimate longing to be free from his constant surveillance? (p. 320)

But this was also how Hans Castorp regarded his cousin Joachim. Even Bauschan's gradual forgetting of his "traumatic" hospital experience is described in terms congruent with the Freudian the-

ory of repression, the complete forgetting and driving down into the unconscious of an unpleasant experience:

He forgot. The hateful and for Bauschan's mental capacity meaningless, episode sank down into the past, unrelieved, unresolved by any explanation or understanding, which would have been impossible; but time covered it over, as it sometimes has to do amongst humans, and we live on above it, while the unuttered recedes deeper and deeper into forgetfulness. . . . (p. 324)

The phrases "unrelieved", "unresolved by any explanation or understanding", "the unuttered" seem almost to be satirically directed against the analytic process. "Repressed" is to be preferred to "resolved"; but at least it is understood as such. And the cadence is at least a literary resolution, if not a psychological one.

These examples indicate, if anything, a negative, satirical attitude towards the dawning ideas of psycho-analysis. But that is not the end of the story. Such passages, however ironically, have established in the reader the idea of the unconscious as central to the idyll, and Mann does take it up seriously with his image of the rushing stream. In animated terms he describes a nearby stream, suggesting perhaps the human mind, certainly Bauschan's and perhaps Hans Castorp's, as "the simplest and most faithful of its kind," at whose bottom lies the foul and the rejected:

The stream here is one of the simplest and most faithful of its kind; there is nothing special about it; its character, the friendly average. Of crystal-clear naïveté, without guile or harm, it is far from claiming pretended depths beneath troubled waters; it is flat and clear and harmlessly reveals the tin cans and the corpse of an old boot lying at the bottom in the green mud. (p. 292)

There the note is still light and humorous. However, Mann returns to the motif at the very end of the idyll, and connects it with the motif of Bauschan's "repressed traumatic experience." Both together do suggest that the "muddy ground" is an image for what Schopenhauer called the "Will" and Freud the unconscious mind:

But that is a long time ago now, more than half a year, and the same thing has happened with the veterinary episode. Time and forgetfulness have covered it over and on its muddy ground, which is the ground of all life, we go on living our lives. (p. 350)

The treatment of these hints at psycho-analysis is largely ironical and negative, but we must remember that Mann is often most serious when he is most ironical, and a positive concession is made here at the very end in the solemnity of that interpolated phrase, "which is the ground of all life." Bauschan may have "repressed" the "trauma," but his master is fully conscious of it. The gentle satire of Herr und Hund does seem to indicate a temporary transition stage between the painful rejection of "psychology" that was part of Die Betrachtungen, and the approval of psycho-analysis that is apparent in the essays grouped around Der Zauberberg — an approval, however, which is always modified by Mann's hesitancy in respect of his integrity as an artist. This little work is, as it were, Mann's quiet pause for breath on the passage of self-discovery that led from Die Betrachtungen to Der Zauberberg.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Louis Fraiberg — Psychoanalysis & American Literary Criticism. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1960. Pp. 263 + xi (with notes and index). \$5.95.

Louis Fraiberg, like many who read literature in the light of psychoanalysis, is almost as much disturbed by literary critics "friendly" to psychoanalysis as by those who are avowedly hostile. Both tend to misunderstand and misapply analysis. Aside from the possibility of ambivalence, two basic factors are responsible: 1) Psychoanalysis is essentially a scientific and medical discipline. Where analysts themselves have applied it to literature, scientific rather than literary interests tend to predominate, with a resulting clinical touch that is disturbing to the non-analyst. 2) Where the literary critic himself is drawn to analysis by the insights it provides, he must translate its terms and ideas into his own frame of reference. The result is likely to be selective, subjective, and somewhat less than accurate.

The remedy that Fraiberg proposes is in essence an analytic school for literary critics. As conducted by himself, the ground floor is devoted to lectures on Freud, Jones, Sachs, and Kris, outlining in simple terms their teachings insofar as they have a bearing on literature and art. On the upper floor is an exhibit of literary critics and their works, ranging from particularly atrocious examples of applied Freudianism to the more acceptable laboratory specimens; the faults and less frequently the virtues, neatly labelled as Van Wyck Brooks, Joseph Wood Krutch, Ludwig Lewisohn, Edmund Wilson, Kenneth Burke, and Lionel Trilling, are displayed in gross and microscopic sections. There is little encouragement for the do-it-yourself Freudian of an earlier and pioneering generation; only professional training will meet the needs of the analytic 'sixties.

The presentation of Freud and the other analysts is good but — as Fraiberg acknowledges — necessarily superficial. "A proper understanding of the writings on art requires a grasp of nothing less than the whole of psychoanalysis," he maintains. Yet assimilation of Fraiberg's material should at the very least reduce certain errors that seem almost ineradicable: 1) the glib equation of psychoanalysis with pansexuality, which was always mistaken, and for at least forty years has been inexcusable; 2) the equally erroneous notion that the analyst attributes all important motivation to the unconscious and especially the oedipus complex; 3) the idea that art, for the analyst, is classed with the neurotic and perverse. One may find all these faults in the type of review which describes a work as "typically Freudian." When, one might inquire, is human behavior ever not typically Freudian?

On the more positive side, however; on the constructive use of analytic understanding by the critic to equip himself more adequately for his own specific functions, Fraiberg necessarily has less to say. The task is of course beset with difficulties; neither the analyst nor the critic has developed a vocabulary or even a consistent viewpoint for this purpose. Such books as Simon Lesser's Fiction and the Unconscious, which we reviewed in these pages some time ago, offer a useful lead in this direction. We are not so certain ourselves of the pathway which Fraiberg elects to follow. While he disclaims such a goal, his approved critic seems destined to become a full-fledged analyst. For if the critic of the future must acquaint himself with "the fundamental scientific assumptions of psychoanalysis, its clinical methods, its historical and scientific development under the influence of Freud, his followers, and those who differed with them, its findings, its interpretations of these in the light of scientific principles, and its possible direction in the future," then it is difficult to see how he can spare himself a full analytic training.

This assumption certainly draws support from the stand that Fraiberg takes in his appraisal of proper Freudianism among the

critics. Thus it is not sufficient for Van Wyck Brooks to venture the opinion that Mark Twain was a neurotic child; Fraiberg seriously demands a description of the symptoms and an exact diagnosis. Brooks attempts to draw a picture of the author's artistic inclinations as constituting a repressed "dual personality"; Fraiberg seems to threaten the possibility of a lawsuit by indignant relatives over the implications of schizophrenia. Yet William G. Barrett, a noted analyst, in a study of the self-naming of Mark Twain, is of the opinion that "Samuel Clemens' life and works show that he felt himself, more than do most of us, to be two people; preoccupied with twins, struggling with symbols of black and white, he was indeed Twain. . . ." (*Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, XXIV [1955], 424-36). Barrett's views coincide with the intuitions of Brooks, and do not seem to require the diagnosis of schizophrenia.

Thus even the well-versed literary critic may find himself engaged in an argument with analysts, who are known at times to disagree among themselves. Such criteria seem irrelevant in appraising Brooks and lead away from the heart of the problem. When Brooks makes the point that Twain unconsciously wished to become an artist, it conveys an insight with which we may or may not agree. To criticize the concept, however, because the unconscious knows nothing of art and creativity cannot be repressed because it is not an instinct — and this is exactly what Fraiberg does — seemingly transcends the boundary between literary criticism and pure (but not necessarily correct) metapsychology.

Indeed, it is difficult on this basis to visualize an acceptable book review of the future which has not been first passed upon by the faculty of an analytic institute. The reviewer, in that instance, would probably be guilty of a metapsychological error in approving of Brooks' suggestion that Twain found unconscious release in images of pent-up rivers that burst their bonds. Fraiberg holds that this opinion is reminiscent of Rousseau's idea of the natural goodness of man, and quite incompatible with Freud. We could only confess our own bafflement and resign from the board of censors. The intrepid censors who remained would then have to face the predicament of passing on Brooks' method of dream interpretation when (with due apologies for his amateur status) he undertakes to interpret two of Mark Twain's dreams but shies away from a third because it is too long and complicated. Fraiberg regards this as unscientific; but then what shall we say of Freud, who sometimes treated his own dreams in the same way and also omitted portions wherever it suited him? As for Brooks' contention that Twain's life as a river pilot already expressed the search of his unconscious for a creative outlet, and Fraiberg's contention that metapsychologically it did not, the censors could only set up a special committee to investigate the matter with the promise that no report would be forthcoming until a new board of censors was appointed.

There is in Fraiberg something of the zeal and crusading spirit of the evangelist, its emotional uplift likely to spill over into a passionate sense of right and wrong in observing every jot and tittle of the law — the whole characterized by a certain lack of perspective. Psychoanalysis is merely a science, laden with much mortal sin and fallibility. Its paths have been strewn with grievous errors, which it has acknowledged and remedied wherever possible; infallibility has not been reached nor is it expected. Freud was probably too ready to lay down his arms in the presence of the artist; nevertheless, we recognize that the most learned analytic exposition on *Hamlet* may not be useful in literary criticism, and a stirring literary commentary on *Hamlet* may not parse exactly in metapsychological terms. Certainly it is not helpful to suggest that literary characters "must" be regarded as real because Freud or Jones chose to do so. Freud was treading on very dubious ground indeed with some of the assumptions that he made about pathography; for example, with Leonardo, to say nothing of Moses. Here he frankly permitted himself the pleasure of indulging in the speculative and even the mystical; few metapsycho-

logists would rate these works highly. If an obvious comparison may be made, in these works Freud was an analyst who engaged for the moment in literary criticism that would not have borne up under too thorough scrutiny by Fraiberg. Yet both analysis and the world's literature would have been the poorer if he had restrained (dare we say repressed?) his creative impulses because of this consideration.

Fraiberg's zealousness, not his metapsychology, seems responsible for his ringing conviction that Freud and Marx were like "oil and water" and that the critic (Edmund Wilson) can combine them only by doing violence to the one or the other. Freud, as in the New Introductory Lectures, seems far more open-minded on the subject and demurred at Marxism precisely at the point beyond which over-enthusiasm might catapult analysis — namely, where it stops being a cautious science of human behavior and takes the form of a passionate Weltanschauung. The voice of reason is soft, and it may therefore be missed that Freud was actually offering a formula that could be used to reconcile psychology with economics as seen by Marx — possibly in the spirit of the tradition that once sought to reconcile God with Caesar. However, Freud was content to indicate a road that might be taken; he did not undertake to travel down that road himself, and said nothing about paving it with good intentions.

Perhaps his attitude toward the relationship between analysis and literary criticism might have been much the same. That Fraiberg chose to follow the road further, that he made charts which future explorers (such as he himself, perhaps) will amend, is surely to his credit. These charts have great value even in their present form. They show a sense of historical context and evolution in the application of Freudianism to literary criticism (the faults of Trilling seem to be merely atavistic remnants in a fundamentally sound psycho-literary constitution). They indicate the constructive uses to which critics have put even the limited knowledge of analysis that they have acquired. His fundamental thesis is also correct, though we may question how it is applied. The conscientious literary critic of today has little choice, if he is to discharge his functions adequately, but to develop an accurate and full layman's acquaintance with the teachings of psychoanalysis. The Zeitgeist makes it predictable that short-cuts and evasions of thought in this matter will be less acceptable to the public in the future than in the past, and that the critic who wishes to make his full contribution to culture and to his own permanent reputation will not neglect to inform himself of the progress that is still being made along the frontiers of the human mind.

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Aldous Huxley — The Devils of Loudun: A Study in the Psychology of Power Politics and Mystical Religion in the France of Cardinal Richelieu. New York: Harper Torchbooks (Paperback), 1959. Pp. 340 (with Bibliography and Index). \$1.75.

Walter Bromberg, M. D. — The Mind of Man: A History of Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis. New York: Harper Torchbooks (Paperback), 1959. Pp. 344 + xxi (with list of Recent Literature and Index). \$1.95.

Sigmund Freud — On Creativity and the Unconscious: Papers on the Psychology of Art, Literature, Love, Religion (Selected, with Introduction and Annotations by Benjamin Nelson). New York: Harper Torchbooks (Paperback), 1958. Pp. 310 + x (with Selected References, Annotations, and Index). \$1.85.

Ordinarily our notice of recent paperback reprints like these three, important as they are, would be limited to a listing under

"Other Books Received" with brief comment on each. However, your Editor was impressed by an (unexpected) element common to all three works, which seems to call for unified treatment here. This does not, of course, constitute a review of the works considered de novo.

Mr. Huxley's systematic and well-documented account of the cause célèbre of Urbain Grandier originally appeared in 1952 and attracted no little critical attention and popular discussion at the time. It has lost none of its powerful impact on the reader, and its reprinting in paperback form seems most appropriate. The force of the tale derives in part from the stark horrors and the incredible brutalities it recounts, in part from its overtones of political timeliness in the depiction of the irrational excesses of a tyrannical and corrupt organized church functioning within the framework of a flourishing political dictatorship, and to an even greater extent from the brilliance of Mr. Huxley's handling of source-material covering over three centuries of research and repeated recountings of the histories of Grandier, Soeur Jeanne des Anges, the Jesuit theologian and exorcist Père Jean-Joseph Surin, and their collaborators and adversaries.

But what impressed your Editor in his present re-reading of the book was Mr. Huxley's studied avoidance of any attempt at a psychodynamic interpretation of the "case-histories" of obsession, delusion, grande hystérie, and other neurotic manifestations, which he describes with a combination of clinical exactness and sadistic satisfaction. Again and again he carries his descriptive psychopathology to a point where it is plain that etiology and dynamic interpretation is clearly called for—and as clearly understood by him—and then systematically digresses. And these digressions invariably carry him into what seems to the present writer to be a most inappropriate discussion of mystical religious experiences, the true nature of "the life of perfection," the nature of mystical self-transcendence, the predilection of Freudians to "pay far more attention to Original Sin than to Original Virtue," the wild fanatic allegation that Freudians "pore over the rats and black beetles, but are reluctant to see the inner Light" (p. 90). Not content with the intrusion of these articles of his own faith into the original text, Mr. Huxley has added an Epilogue in amplification, covering fifteen additional pages (313-327) in the present edition. And the sole point of contact seems to be Mr. Huxley's desire to proclaim his certainty that, while belief in demonic possession may have been a snare and a delusion in the misguided seventeenth century, the reality of such phenomena under other circumstances cannot and should not be denied!

Mr. Huxley seems to have made the subject of Urbain Grandier so exclusively his own that there has been a remarkable alteration in the text of the second work listed above. Dr. Bromberg's history of psychopathology, originally published in 1937, devoted three pages in the chapter on "Witchcraft, the Mass Delusion" to the "devils of Loudun" (pp. 52-54), giving the basic facts without Huxley's detail and with certain inaccuracies which Huxley seems to have corrected. The present edition, which retains a chapter on "Witchcraft and Psychotherapy," does not so much as mention Père Grandier or Soeur Jeanne. Yet, despite Stefan Zweig's brilliant account of Mesmer in his Mental Healers, Dr. Bromberg still gives very adequate treatment to the origins of "animal magnetism" and the gentleman of the lilac robe.

Dr. Nelson's selection of sixteen of Freud's papers on art constitutes a valuable addition to the library of scholarly paperbacks, although it is by no means complete or even comprehensive. The limitation to essays which appeared in the fourth volume of the Collected Papers leads to some serious gaps. What collection of Freud's papers on "Creativity and the Unconscious" can be considered even representative when it omits the study "Dostoevsky and Parricide," for example? The definitive edition of "Freud's Writings on Art" is still to be edited in the future, and, with all due respect to Dr. Nelson, the editor of the admirable sym-

posium on Freud and the 20th Century (New York, 1957), we suggest as editor of such a definitive collection a scholar in the field of literary criticism, preferably Louis Fraiberg.

For our present purpose of comparison we should like to call attention to Freud's 1923 essay on "A Neurosis of Demoniactal Possession in the Seventeenth Century" (pp. 264-300 in Dr. Nelson's collection). There are no "rats and black beetles," no judgments on Sin or Virtue, whether "Original" or otherwise; instead, we find the usual quiet, closely-reasoned analysis of the facts, the probable causes, and some of the humanistic implications of the case of one Christoph Haitzmann, a Bavarian painter who had "sold his soul to the Devil" and who obtained release from his "pact" and the return of his written "contract" (in two forms and on two separate occasions) through "miraculous intervention" at the shrine of Mariazell in the year 1677. The account, written in a style which can compare favorably even with the writing of a professional literary artist like Mr. Huxley (and admirably translated by Dr. Edward Glover), comes like a breath of fresh air to one who has just read the fetid horrors of The Devils of Loudun. Dr. Nelson's comment in his Introduction is well justified:

The connections between the transactions of Haitzmann with the devil and the numberless variations of the Faust legend do not escape Freud, although he utterly resists the temptation to abandon the texts at hand for showy expeditions into comparative mythology and psychology. Almost at every turn in the paper's development one finds oneself posing fresh questions concerning details of one or another instance of the Faust story, whether it be Marlowe, Goethe, Lenau, or Thomas Mann. At the paper's end one recognizes that one must think twice before depreciating Freud's understanding and learning in the field of religion. (pp. ix-x)

L. F. M.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

Brief comment here does not preclude full review in a later issue.

John W. Aldridge — The Party at Cranton. New York: David McKay Co., 1960. Pp. 184. \$3.50.

Another academic roman à clef for anyone who cares to take the trouble to discover the key and the lock which it opens. The author's previous efforts have been in scholarly criticism.

Franz Alexander, M. D. — The Western Mind in Transition. New York: Random House, 1960. Pp. 300 + xvi (with Bibliographical Notes and Index). \$5.00

Your Editor reserves for himself the privilege of commenting in a later issue on the spiritual and intellectual autobiography of one of the great psychoanalyst-philosophers of the first post-Freudian generation.

Norman O. Brown — Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History. New York: Random House (A Modern Library Paperback), 1960. Pp. 366 + xiv (including Reference Notes, Bibliography, and Index). \$1.25.

This work, reviewed in our last issue (X, 1, 28-31) as a recent publication by a university press, has achieved, with phenomenal rapidity, re-publication as a mass-produced paperback; another indication, if any was needed, of the growing audience for this type of work.

Robert C. Elliott — The Power of Satire: Magic, Ritual, Art. Princeton Univ. Press, 1960. Pp. 300 + xi (with Index). \$6.00.

For later review. The questions which Professor Elliott (Ohio State) raises concerning the residues of belief in the magic

power of satire involve a fascinating interdisciplinary investigation in anthropology, depth psychology, and literary criticism.

Leslie A. Fiedler — Love and Death in the American Novel. New York: Criterion Books, 1960. Pp. 603 + xxxiv (with Index). \$8.50.

To be reviewed in a later issue in a manner which will certainly be superior to Mr. Cowley's disgraceful exhibition on the front page of The New York Times Book Review for March 27, 1960.

Lawrence S. Kubie, M. D. — Neurotic Distortion of the Creative Process. Lawrence: Univ. of Kansas Press, 1958 (Porter Lectures, Series 22). Pp. 151 + vii (with Bibliography and Index). \$3.00.

A full review of this important work will appear in a later issue. We reproduce here the author's striking conclusions:

(1) Neurosis corrupts, mars, distorts, and blocks creativeness in every field.

(2) No one need fear that getting well will cause an atrophy of his creative drive.

(3) This illusory fear rests on the erroneous assumption that it is that which is unconscious in us which makes us creative, whereas in fact the unconscious is our straitjacket, rendering us as stereotyped and as sterile and repetitive as is the neurosis itself.

(4) Where unconscious influences play a dominant role the creative process in science or art becomes almost identical with the neurotic process — merely transmuting unconscious conflicts into some socially and artistically acceptable symbolic form.

(5) The goal to seek is to free preconscious processes from the distortions and obstructions interposed by unconscious processes and from the pedestrian limitations of conscious processes. The unconscious can spur it on. The conscious can criticize and correct and evaluate. But creativity is a product of preconscious activity. This is the challenge which confronts the education of the future.

F. R. Leavis — New Bearings in English Poetry: A Study of the Contemporary Situation. Univ. of Michigan Press, 1960 (Ann Arbor Paperback AA 36). Pp. 238 + v (no index). \$1.85.

George W. Nitchie — Human Values in the Poetry of Robert Frost. Durham, N. C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1960. Pp. 242 + ix (with List of works cited and Index). \$5.00.

J. B. Priestley — Literature and Western Man. New York: Harper & Bros., 1960. Pp. 512 + xi (with Appendix of Brief Biographies and Index). \$6.95.

Our readers will be interested — perhaps surprised — by Mr. Priestley's use of an over-simplified psychodynamic approach to literary classification. He equates Romanticism with the dominance of the Unconscious; classicism with the authors' more conscious control of their materials. He insists, however, on the necessity for balance, what we would today probably call "ego-control," by his shrewd assertion that Id-dominated drives, uncontrolled, lead to madness; excessive conscious control, to pedantry and boredom. (Cf. Kubie, supra.)

Karl Shapiro — In Defense of Ignorance. New York: Random House, 1960. Pp. 338 + x (no index). \$4.00.

Nothing we might say here would add much to Professor Richard Ellmann's neat and final disposal of these essays in his review in The New York Times Book Review for May 8, 1960. His conclusion, that the "book does not defend ignorance, if that is worth defending, but only willfulness," we heartily endorse. Yet we suppose it was worth the trouble to preserve within the covers of a book with an epigraph "everything we are taught is false" an ignorance so unique and precious as this one.

Michel Alexander Vallon — An Apostle of Freedom: Life and Teachings of Nicholas Berdyaev. New York: Philosophical Libr., 1960. Pp. 369 (with Notes, Bibliography, and Index). \$6.00.

Ralph B. Winn, ed. — A Concise Dictionary of Existentialism: Kierkegaard — Jaspers — Marcel — Heidegger — Sartre — de Beauvoir. New York: Philosophical Libr., 1960. Pp. 122. \$2.75.

Useful? We quote the following definition (p. 84):

Existential psychoanalysis . . . is a method destined to bring to light, in a strictly objective form, the subjective choice by which each living person makes himself a person; that is, makes known to himself what he is. Since what the method seeks is a choice of being at the same time as a being, it must reduce particular behavior patterns to fundamental relations — not of sexuality or of the will to power, but of being — which are expressed in this behavior. It is then guided from the start toward a comprehension of being and must not assign itself any other goal than to discover being and the mode of being of the being confronting this being. It is forbidden to stop before attaining this goal. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness.

Your Editor feels that he would rather not start. Still, as the book-jacket explains, the spokesmen for existentialism have never been in agreement among themselves, and there is no assurance that Binswanger or Viktor Frankl would accept this definition or even try to make sense out of it.

Mary A. Wyman — The Lure for Feeling in the Creative Process (with a Foreword by F. S. C. Northrop). New York: Phil. Libr., 1960. Pp. 192+xiii (with a Glossary keyed to the writings of Whitehead; Notes, and Index). \$4.75.

The author moves from Alfred North Whitehead to Chinese mysticism, Wordsworth, Goethe, Emerson, Burroughs, and Whitman.

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Offprints received (from the authors, unless otherwise noted):

*-Frederick Wyatt's review of Simon O. Lesser, Fiction and the Unconscious, and Leo Lowenthal, Literature and the Image of Man — Sociological Studies of the European Drama and Novel 1600-1900 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957); Contemp Psy, V, 3 (Mar 1960), 92-95. [From Mr. Lesser]

%-Leon Edel, "Willa Cather: The Paradox of Success" (a lecture delivered under the auspices of the Gertrude Clarke Whittall Poetry & Literature Fund in the Coolidge Auditorium of the Library of Congress, Oct. 12, 1959). Published by the Reference Department of the Library of Congress in 1960.

Concerning this paper Professor Edel wrote to your Editor that "it is psychological in that it takes its impulse (though I do not say so) from Freud's essay on Rosmersholm."

&-Edward Joseph Shoben, Jr., "Love, Loneliness, and Logic" (adapted from the presidential address to the Division of Counseling Psychology, APA, Cincinnati, Ohio; Sept 5, 1959), Jrnl Ind Psy, 16, 1 (May 1960), 11-24.

&- - - - - , "The Role of Culture in the Teaching of Personality Development," Sociol Rev Monograph No 1 (July 1958), Keele, Univ Coll of North Staffordshire, England, 87-107.

&- - - - - , "Viewpoints from Related Disciplines: Learning Theory," Tchrs Coll Rec, 60, 5 (Feb 1959), 272-282.

&- - - - - , "Towards a Concept of the Normal Personality," Amer Psychology, 12, 4 (Apr 1957), 183-189.

&- - - - - , "Sin and Guilt in Psychotherapy," read as part of a Symposium on "The Role of the Concept of Sin in Psychotherapy," APA, Cincinnati, Ohio; Sept 4, 1959.

Because of its obvious relevance to Dr. Hovey's discussion of the concepts of sin and guilt in that portion of his 1959 Convention paper which dealt with The Cocktail Party, we asked for Dr. Hovey's reactions to the last-named paper. Part of his reply follows:

From actual experience, direct personal dealings with neurotics, I sometimes ask myself, 'How far must I excuse this fellow because he is the helpless victim of a neurosis? and how far is he responsible for behaving badly?' I seldom get a clear-cut answer. The precise relationship between moral wrong-doing and psychic illness looks to me like one of the eternal questions — and we soon get into some problems of law-and-psychiatry, too. Perhaps in some ultimate (transcendental-Platonic?) sense, sin and sickness are related? As to Celia Coplestone, I'm a bit surprised Eliot did not reveal her as feeling at least a little guilty over her affair with another woman's husband. (But then he allowed his Harry in The Family Reunion to evidently feel guiltless about certain matters which would trouble most consciences.) So far as I can tell, Celia thinks she is a sinner — i.e., whether we want to say she has a sense of sin or a sense of guilt — not because she has hurt herself or anybody else, but only because she is a 'failure'

Towards someone, or something, outside myself;
And I feel I must . . . atone.

This 'someone, or something,' is, I suppose, Eliot's God. If Celia has, in a non-supernatural way, violated her own integrity or gone against her own better self, Eliot has not brought that out explicitly.

&-Roy P. Basler, "All the Difference" (a talk on the occasion of the dedication of the Robert Frost Room in the Jones Library, Amherst, Mass.; Oct. 21, 1959).

&-Donald R. Roberts, "An Electrophysiological Theory of Hypnosis," Int Jnl Clin & Exper Hypnosis, VIII, 1 (Jan 1960), 43-55. [Professor Roberts refers to this paper as "Item No. 1 in my do-it-yourself project in physical psychology."]

&-Coleman O. Parsons, "The Background of The Mysterious Stranger," Amer Lit, XXXII, 1 (Mar 1960), 55-74.

*-John V. Hagopian, "Psychology and the Coherent Form of Shakespeare's Othello," Papers of the Mich Acad of Sci, Arts, and Letters, XLV (1960 [1959 Meeting]), 373-380. Professor Hagopian's paper, which was noticed in our last issue (X, 1, 34), but had not yet appeared in print, was the subject of correspondence between your Editor and the author, from which the following are excerpts:

M-H: I have a bone to pick with your Othello paper. Not the conclusion; that, I think, is quite tenable. But your way of dealing with psychoanalytic predecessors is, it seems to me, misguided. The question is whether Miss [Ella Freeman] Sharpe, for instance, presents a convincing case in her critical analysis of Hamlet. To my mind, she doesn't. But that is because she approaches all psychoanalytic problems in terms of oral or anal development. . . . You take her to task not for her probable error in interpretation, but for her language in expressing it. The language you quote is highly technical, to be sure; I wouldn't want to have a literary critic use it. . . . [But] Miss Sharpe is expressing psychoanalytic concepts which could not be expressed without using much longer and cir-

cuitous language, and, furthermore, she is using that language in a collection of papers on psychoanalysis, where the literary criticism is secondary and the readers are supposed to be acquainted with the terms of art. And if, as you imply on p. 373, you object to 'psychoanalytic allegory,' then you object to your own approach in writing the very paper you submit. The question is whether the 'psychoanalytic allegory' is convincing and helpful in understanding the literary work. And the real difference is that yours is and hers isn't.

And your animadversions on Wagh are supererogatory and irrelevant, for you are not considering Iago's motivation to any considerable extent, but rather the astonishing success which his tentative explorations have on Othello and Desdemona, a success which you motivate very neatly in terms of O & D.... Gordon Smith's "Iago the Paranoiac" in Amer. Imago, 16, 2 (Sum 59)... evaluates how much Wagh is worth as literary criticism and how much Wagh missed that he might have used....

H-M ...of course you are right in observing that p-a technical terms in their contexts should not be so labeled. I could not have used Smith since my paper was written last January, read in March. Iago's motives need not be considered much more fully than I have treated them, because, as I said in my footnote on Wagh, the proper approach to a work of literature is a Gestalt approach. Iago's motives are a relatively small part of the gestalt and are considerably 'embedded,' if you see the relevance of that gestalt term here. My own approach is hardly allegorical in that I do not equate characters with certain abstract concepts (be they purity or super-ego), but rather as involved (pace Holland) in a pattern of charged interpersonal relationships....

From The Centennial Review of Arts and Sciences:

&-Bertrand Russell, "Non-Demonstrative Inference," III, 3 (Sum 1959), 237-257. [There are interesting psychological overtones in this chapter from Russell's My Philosophical Development.]

&-Harvey Gross, "Music and the Analogue of Feeling: Notes on Eliot and Beethoven," Ibid, 269-288.

%-Hudson Hoagland, "The Seven Deadly Sins: Wrath. A Biologist's Viewpoint," Ibid, 289-303.

Hoagland, as biologist discussing Dante, joins the Eliot-Hovey-Shoben symposium on sin and guilt, supra:

The concept of sin is not one used by scientists. Sin is a theological term for an act that is an affront to the will of God, and scientists, as scientists, have no operational procedures for dealing with divine sanctions or of knowing what they are. I shall accordingly consider evil rather than sin, and define evil as that which is harmful to human dignity in man's pursuit of the good life. (pp. 289-290)

&-Thomas J. J. Altizer, "Science and Gnosis in Jung's Psychology," Ibid, 304-320.

%-Lionel Stevenson, "1859: Year of Fulfillment," III, 4 (Fall 1959) [Darwin-Marx Centennial number], 337-356.

%-Stanley Edgar Hyman, "Darwin the Dramatist," Ibid, 364-375.

&-Practically every article in the number devoted to Issues in Criticism (IV, 1 [Win 1960]) would carry this sign.